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Towards a Theory of Regional Multinationals: A 




This paper develops new theory to help explain the recent empirical work that 
demonstrates the profound lack of global sales, with 320 of the 380 largest firms in the 
world averaging 80% of their sales within their home region. Transaction cost economics 
(TCE) concepts are used to explain why large firms adopt regional, rather than global, 
strategies. A new theory of international management built to explain regional-level 
strategy and structure is developed.  In this, a firm's geographic scope of sales is limited 










Internationalization is a well-understood concept at the macro-level: it refers to the 
increasing economic interdependence among nations, as a result of liberalized, and 
technologically facilitated, economic exchange of capital, raw materials, intermediate 
goods (including knowledge), human resources, manufactured end products, and 
services. Such interdependence is shown in country-level balance of trade and investment 
data, at an aggregated level (i.e., overall trade and investment stocks and flows, across all 
countries), Rugman (2000). Unfortunately, in the past two decades, many authors from 
academia and the public policy sphere have made a conceptual quantum leap, equating 
internationalization with globalization, i.e., the idea that the world is a fully integrated 
market place.  
 
The problem with such a perspective on globalization is that it assumes away the 
necessity of selectivity in internationalization. Such selectivity is only partly introduced 
at the macro-level, for example when countries decide to engage in regional trade and 
investment agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the European Union (EU) see below. More importantly, selectivity in 
internationalization is mainly a firm-driven phenomenon. Firm-level selectivity in 
internationalization is the key issue addressed in this article, and the relevance of the 
transaction cost economics approach (TCE) suggested here, is demonstrated by briefly re-
interpreting the findings of several recent papers. 
 
The Need for a Regional Theory 
 
Selectivity in internationalization, whether at the macro-level or the firm level, implies 
that economic actors establish governance mechanisms to “manage” international 
transactions. At the macro-level, governance mechanisms or institutions refer to “the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. 
They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”, North (1991). 
When a TCE perspective is adopted, the impact of macro-level parameters should not be 
studied in the typical orthodox economics, marginalist way (e.g., impact of change in 
income taxes or exchange rates on foreign direct investment – FDI – flows), but in terms 
of effects on the comparative attractiveness of discrete governance structures (e.g., the 
impact of NAFTA on the Canadian economy and on the behavior of multinational 
enterprises). At the macro-level, economic and social reorganization, aimed to increase 
particular forms of internationalization (e.g., attracting more inward FDI) cannot occur in 
a piecemeal fashion. If, for example, a government wishes to attract more FDI in the high 
technology sphere, all shift parameters that affect the choice of entry mode, e.g., the 
general property rights regime, patent enforcement regime, extent of bureaucratic 
discretion etc., need to be addressed simultaneously to create a shift by MNEs toward 
setting up subsidiaries instead of working with market contracts. In other words, macro-
level policies are important to the extent that they shift firm-level choices from one 
discrete governance structure toward another.  
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The difficulty in the internationalization sphere is, however, that economic 
welfare can only be expected to increase at the national level, if norms of reciprocity 
prevail with the other countries involved in the internationalization process. Designing 
such norms of reciprocity can be viewed as the solution to a TCE problem. However, 
achieving this at the regional level may be easier than at the global level. Paradoxically, 
authors such as Bhagwati (2002) have emphasized the alleged economic inferiority of 
regional vis-à-vis multilateral integration outcomes. In reality, regionalism is often an 
efficient substitute for ill-functioning multilateral institutions, Rugman and Verbeke 
(2003). A regional integration process (with only a limited number of participants that are 
geographically close, and with a comparatively low economic and institutional distance) 
is easier than a multilateral integration process that could involve all the members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  
 
In this context, one can also recognize the organic nature of economic integration 
in regional clusters, Krugman (1993), Frankel, Stein, and Wi (1995). Here, regional 
integration is not driven primarily by the strategic intent of government agencies and 
powerful economic actors to increase or consolidate economic exchange within a region 
through new institutions in a top-down fashion. Rather, it reflects bottom-up efforts by a 
multitude of economic actors, who wish to expand their geographical business horizon, 
guided by immediate opportunities that are geographically close and associated with low 
transaction costs, as well as a high potential for agglomeration economies. In the long 
run, such agglomeration, in the sense of improved ‘regional diamond conditions’ may 
improve the MNEs’ capabilities to penetrate other markets outside of the initial region, 
Rugman and Verbeke (2003b).  
 
The problem with the globalization view as expressed by authors such as 
Bhagwati (2002) is that it ignores the non-remediableness issue, discussed in modern, 
TCE thinking, Williamson (1996). Arguing that multilateral agreements are always better 
than regional agreements does not address the real-life TCE challenge of negotiating a 
new trade and investment regime, agreeing on a set of rules and efficiently implementing 
these rules, Buck (2004).  
 
At the micro-level, governance implies that economic agents attempt to align 
transactions with governance structures, in order to achieve economizing outcomes. Here, 
a variety of alternative alignments can be described in terms of different types of 
transactions and feasible governance structures to organize these transactions. The 
selection/retention of particular governance structures is described/prescribed in terms of 
the alignments between transactions and governance structures that are comparatively 
most efficient.  
 
Selectivity in internationalization requires that some patterns of macro-level 
internationalization (e.g., in terms of the chosen sequence in time of international trade 
agreements), as well as firm-level internationalization (e.g., in terms of geographic scope 
of sequential entry decisions and choice of entry modes) are more efficient than other 
ones. This is an application of the discriminating alignment hypothesis, Williamson 
(1996). The problem with conventional Williamsonian transaction cost economics  
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reasoning, however, is that it does not fully address the impact of geographic scope 
choices to solve the bounded rationality and bounded reliability problems critical to MNE 
decision making. Interestingly, mainstream internalization theory, i.e., the TCE 
framework developed to address MNE expansion patterns, Buckley and Casson (1976), 
Rugman (1981) and Hennart (1982), has not fully addressed this issue either. 
Internalization theory does address the choice of entry mode, and recognizes that the 
liability of foreignness is not necessarily identical in all host countries, but it has, so far, 
not fully integrated the choice of geographic scope as a key parameter driving managerial 
decision making on internationalization. Specifically, though location is viewed as 
important, it refers to the fact that the MNE must make a choice among alternative 
locations, with location advantages viewed as largely exogenous, rather than (at least 
partially) as design variables. 
 
In an abundant literature on product diversification of large firms, the key 
conclusion is that selectivity is required when making product diversification decisions. 
The normative message is that clear limits should be imposed on (especially unrelated) 
product diversification in order to avoid negative effects on economic performance. The 
main reason for this is the ex post (after the firm has diversified) ‘impossibility of 
selective intervention’, Williamson (1996). It is difficult to mimic the efficiency of 
markets inside the firm, given that the internal incentive system is less high powered than 
the one provided by external markets. It is also difficult to decide when to alleviate 
market pressures inside the firm, in order to contribute to more efficient internal 
management.  
 
The elimination of market norms, as a result of selective, hierarchical 
intervention, is fraught with bounded rationality problems and sub-goal pursuit. Indeed 
the expected economies of scale and scope, as well as risk reduction benefits, are less 
likely to materialize, or more likely to be overcompensated by additional production and 
transaction costs, in the case of unrelated diversification. Firms often engage in unrelated 
diversification to capitalize on 'external opportunities', but the successful exploration of 
such opportunities require a match with the firm's internal capabilities. What is perceived 
to be an external market opportunity is, in fact, a managerial decision variable. A similar 
point can be made regarding the need for selectivity in international diversification, or 
geographic scope of the firm’s activities. Specifically, we will argue, from a TCE 
perspective, that a broader geographic scope leads to additional costs, in the sense of 
more severe bounded rationality constraints and the danger of increased sub-goal pursuit, 
thus requiring regional components in strategy and structure. 
 
A TCE Model of Regional Strategy 
 
At the most general level, TCE addresses three issues. First, management must determine 
the firm’s “boundaries” (the make-or-buy decision). In the context of internationalization, 
this choice has two key components, namely the choice of geographic scope of the firm’s 
activities and the choice of entry mode, given a particular geographic scope. Second, 
management must design the interface (or rather the multiple interfaces) with the external 
environment. In the international context, the key questions are whether the relations with  
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customers and suppliers will be managed similarly or differently to what prevails in the 
home country. Third, managers must engage in the internal design of the organization. At 
the international level, the specific question is how to structure the foreign subsidiary 
network.  
 
When given a simple TCE interpretation, the three sets of decisions above have as 
their main (economizing) purpose to mitigate contractual hazards. Such hazards arise 
from bounded rationality, Simon (1961), and bounded reliability constraints faced by the 
MNE’s management. We prefer the term bounded reliability, rather than the 
Williamsonian concept of opportunism. The latter concept implies a devious intent by 
individuals, whereas the former simply builds upon the observation that individuals 
cannot always be expected to make good on open-ended promises. This may be 
interpreted as sub-goal pursuit, but without necessarily attributing this deficiency to self-
interest seeking with guile, see also Verbeke (2003), for a related discussion. Bounded 
reliability reflects resource scarcity, similar to bounded rationality (which means scarcity 
of mind). Opportunism does not reflect such scarcity, and is therefore an odd concept as a 
foundation of economics driven models.  
 
What are the origins of specific contractual hazards that characterize international 
business? The conventional drivers of contractual hazards are amplified by the presence 
of nation-state borders, barriers of time and space, economic differences, and institutional 
differences. These drivers include, inter alia, bilateral dependency relationships 
(investments in specific assets abroad) with actors exhibiting characteristics different 
from those prevailing in the home country, weak property rights in foreign trade and 
investment regimes, subsidiary performance measurement-difficulties, inter-temporal 
lock-in (e.g., fixed exchange rates in international sales contracts), etc. 
 
Given the above contractual hazards, superior performance results from crafting 
necessarily incomplete, but farsighted contracts, which make selective use of governance 
mechanisms to mitigate these hazards. Does a lack of globalization by many large MNEs, 
as measured by their intra-regional geographic distribution of sales, reflects poor 
performance in transaction cost economizing? Not if the observed “failure” to implement 
a global strategy cannot be “remedied” in practice, as a result of proper transaction cost 
economizing, i.e., without referring to hypothetical ideals such as the “global firm” with a 
perfectly balanced distribution of sales around the main economic regions of the globe, 
Rugman and Verbeke (2004). Given the empirical observation that there are only nine 
such global firms in the 500 largest companies in the world, and an overwhelming 
majority are home-region based firms, there is an issue of non-remediableness here. This 
point is not understood by the management scholars who advocate global strategies. 
 
While bounded rationality and bounded reliability constraints may well impede 
globalization, “farsighted contracting” is still attempted in the firms’ internationalization 
strategy. The anticipation of globalization hazards (i.e., the inefficiencies that would 
result from overstretching in geographic diversification), as well as learning from such 
hazards, can be instrumental in future choices of geographic scope of activities. The 
conceptual problem described above is visualized in Figure 1, on the impact of  
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geographic scope on transaction cost economizing. Geographic scope refers to the 
distribution of the firm’s assets, activities, and sales across geographic space. Geographic 
scope may be viewed as having a weak or a strong impact on the choice of the firm’s 
boundaries and the interface with external actors (including alliance partners, suppliers, 
and customers). This is represented on the vertical axis of Figure 1. On the horizontal 
axis, we find the impact of geographic scope on the internal design of the MNE’s 
governance structure; this impact can again be strong or weak.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Most of the conventional TCE work can be positioned in quadrant 2 of Figure 1: 
here, the impact of geographic scope is considered weak, since this parameter is usually 
not taken into account when formulating and testing specific discriminating alignment 
hypotheses. Even the mainstream work on the multidivisional form (M-form) is more 
interested in the availability of this organizational technology in the home country, to 
explain rapid international expansion, than in a careful analysis of the MNE’s absorptive 
capacity to manage the firm’s activities in foreign locations.  
 
Conventional internalization theory properly addresses the choice of entry mode, 
and thereby the design of the interface with external actors, and can be positioned in 
quadrant 1. Much of the international business work on intra-MNE functioning, 
especially the work on differentiated network MNEs, Birkinshaw (2002) addresses the 
internal management issues, which increase in complexity with increased geographic 
scope, but often without an explicit TCE focus, though much of the analysis can be given 
a TCE interpretation, (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003c). Such work, on subsidiary-specific 
advantages can be placed in quadrant 4. 
 
The present article, as well as other recent papers on regional strategies of MNEs, 
addresses the MNE internationalization issue from a quadrant 3 perspective. Here, 
geographic scope is viewed as critical to internationalization choices on the firm’s 
boundaries (and the associated management of the external interface) and the internal 
governance structure. Specifically, geographic scope is addressed from a regional 
perspective. 
 
The TCE Perspective and Regional Strategy  
 
Conventional internalization theory suggests that international sales arise because firms 
possess firm-specific advantages (FSAs), i.e., proprietary knowledge, which can be 
exploited profitably across national borders, whether through exports, foreign direct 
investment, market contracts, or hybrid modes. Further, and especially in the context of 
market-seeking investment, internalization advantages, in the sense of comparatively 
higher efficiency of hierarchy vis-à-vis other entry modes, are critical to the explanation 
of foreign direct investment and the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. Finally, 
country-specific advantages (CSAs) are important in explaining the precise location of 
international expansion, Dunning (1993), Rugman (1981 and 1996). Given the above, the 
regional concentration of sales of the world’s 500 largest MNEs, as described in Rugman  
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(2000) and Rugman and Verbeke (2004), is puzzling. Why would most American, 
European, and Asian MNEs in a single industry have a concentration of their sales in 
their home region, if they (a) possess proprietary knowledge that is internationally 
transferable/exploitable, (b) can benefit from similar internalization advantages 
associated with FDI, building upon this proprietary knowledge, and (c) most importantly, 
face similar location advantages critical to successful market-seeking investment?   
 
One, albeit unsatisfactory, explanation is provided by internationalization theory, 
Johansson and Vahlne (1977 and 1990). This theory argues that MNEs expand first in 
geographically proximate markets and engage in modest resource commitments. As 
experiential learning is built up, firms venture into more distant markets and engage in 
more complex and more far-reaching resource commitments. The problem with 
internationalization theory is that it lacks serious conceptual grounding and 
generalizability, especially as regards what exactly constitutes geographic proximity or 
experiential learning, and the mechanisms through which these concepts influence FDI 
decisions and the geographic scope of operations and sales.  
 
A more useful explanation of regional MNE activity, fully in line with the modern 
TCE theory of the firm, but extending this theory from quadrant 2 to quadrant 3 in Figure 
1, is that the scope of geographic expansion is determined by the MNE’s ability to link its 
FSAs with location advantages abroad. International success does not simply follow from 
proprietary knowledge in, e.g., R&D or marketing, but from the MNE’s ability to adapt 
successfully the deployment of its existing FSAs to the specific circumstances of foreign 
markets, i.e., by better aligning FSAs and CSAs. We have argued elsewhere, Rugman 
and Verbeke (1992, 2001, 2003c, 2004), that such adaptation can take several forms, 
especially (a) investments in the development  of location-bound FSAs in foreign markets 
(leading to benefits of national responsiveness) to complement non-location-bound FSAs, 
and (b) investments in the development of new, non-location-bound FSAs in foreign 
subsidiaries.  
 
It could be argued that there is nothing new in this analysis; MNEs are faced with 
the liability of foreignness, i.e., additional costs of doing business abroad, and such costs 
are simply higher in host-region markets than in home-region markets. However, our 
proposition is that, at the market side, these costs could be viewed as the result of implicit 
contracts with foreign locations. The intended outcome is stronger embeddedness of the 
firm’s extended knowledge base in these foreign locations, and therefore higher sales. In 
other words, asset specificity (in the form of additional, location-specific linking 
investments) is incurred, implying that such transactions, even if successful, come at a 
cost, as compared to the conventional deployment of FSAs in locations where no such 
linking investments need to be made to increase sales. 
 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the MNE’s commitment of resources 
to link its existing pool of FSAs with foreign-location advantages (such as the presence of 
a large market), through crafting location-bound FSAs or even new, non-location-bound 
FSAs in foreign markets, in no way guarantees success. The resource commitments made 
to attract potential foreign customers and to increase sales are fully one-sided. This is in  
  7
contrast with, e.g., resource-seeking or strategic asset-seeking FDI, whereby foreign 
locations may again require location-specific linking investments from the MNE, but 
whereby all relevant parties, such as foreign suppliers, workers, and acquired companies 
themselves engage in reciprocal commitments to make these investments worthwhile.  
 
The above analysis suggests that the puzzle of regional concentration of sales has 
transaction cost-related origins: in the case of market-driven geographic expansion, what 
is conventionally viewed as the MNE’s proprietary knowledge (its FSAs), is not just 
deployed in geographic space in those locations where exogenously determined CSAs (in 
this case an attractive market) are the greatest in an objective sense. Each foreign location 
requires location-specific linking investments to meld existing FSAs with CSAs. It is, 
ceteris paribus, the extent of these adaptation costs, taking into account the 
redeployability of the resulting additional knowledge in the relevant locations, that 
explains why most MNEs expand first in their home region, and may face great difficulty 
expanding to other regions.  
 
Home Regions Confer Efficiency 
 
More specifically, many so-called non-location-bound FSAs can only be exploited 
profitably within the home region, without the need for substantial, location-specific 
adaptation investments. In addition, location-bound FSAs developed in the home country 
or in other countries in the home region can be “tuned up” to be fully deployable in the 
entire region, with low-linking investments required, if the countries involved are subject 
to a low institutional and economic distance among themselves, in the spirit of Ghemawat 
(2001). Hence, these FSAs can easily be made 'region-bound', to the extent that linking 
investments with high institutional and economy-related specificity can be avoided. In 
other words, it can be efficient for an MNE to expand within its home region; it does not 
need to go global.  
 
This process is further enhanced if governments in a region pursue policies that 
promote internal coherence via administrative and political harmonization (as in the EU) 
or even merely via economic integration (as in NAFTA and Asia). Such public policies 
reduce the MNE’s needs to engage in idiosyncratic, location-specific adaptation 
investments to meld existing FSAs and foreign-location advantages. In contrast, host 
regions may require large adaptation investments driven by home/host region differences 
in the institutional and economic sphere in order to meld the MNE’s existing knowledge 
base and the host-region location advantages. This requirement for high, region-specific 
'linking' investments acts as an entry deterrent for many MNEs.  
 
A related point is that inter-block business is likely to be restricted relative to 
intra-regional sales by government imposed barriers to entry. For example, the EU and 
the United States are likely to fight trade wars and be responsive to domestic business 
lobbies seeking shelter in the form of subsidies and/or protection. Institutional and 
economy-related differences among members of a single triad region may remain, but 
these will mostly be less significant than across triad regions, Rugman (2000). The end 
result is the persistence of MNEs that will continue to earn 80% or more of their income  
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in their home-triad region. There will only be a limited number of purely ‘global’ MNEs 
in the top 500.  
 
In contrast, as mentioned above, transactions that do not relate to sales (or the 
customer end of the value chain) but to more upstream activities, are not one-sided 
(meaning the MNE engages in location-specific adaptation investments without any 
customer guarantees to purchase the MNEs products). Upstream value-chain activities 
entail transactions whereby all relevant economic actors may make credible commitments 
to craft a highly efficient manufacturing or logistics chain apparatus (including workers, 
outside component suppliers, logistics providers, etc.). 
 
A TCE Reinterpretation of Recent Papers  
 
Delios and Beamish (2004), in their study of 1,229 Japanese MNEs, conclude that global 
strategies are confined to the MNEs that have the highest R&D, advertising, and 
exporting intensities. These intensities result in strongly non-location bound, stand-alone 
FSAs, which do not require expensive, additional linking investments, to match them 
with location advantages in host countries. In other words, globalization can be achieved 
because of low transaction costs, associated with deploying and exploiting the MNE’s 
FSAs in distant markets. In contrast, regional strategies appear critical to those companies 
that lack such stand-alone, non-location bound FSAs. These firms may follow leading 
companies into other nations in the home region (in this case, Asia), and benefit from the 
transaction cost-reducing properties of replicating, e.g., domestic buyer-supplier networks 
abroad. However, such behavior appears to place strict boundaries on international 
expansion, possibly because the replication of home-country success formulas can be 
expected to work only in those foreign environments that have an appropriate set of 
institutional and economic conditions matched to those of the home country (or that 
permit the crafting of such a match by the firms themselves). 
 
Lei Li (2004) argues, using data from U.S. service firms, that a global strategy, 
which implies dealing with multiple foreign environments and organizational structures 
simultaneously, will lead to high bureaucratic costs and stretch managers’ execution 
capacity and absorptive capacity, thereby having detrimental effects on performance. 
However, these types of transaction costs can be avoided by adopting a home-triad region 
orientation. Such a choice in favor of restricted geographic scope, tends to alleviate a 
firm’s bounded rationality problems in the early stages of internationalization and also 
permits the firm to enjoy a wider “effective zone of internationalization” (meaning, 
without detrimental effects on performance). 
 
Michael Enright (2004a, b), in his two papers, addresses the issue of regional 
structures, with an application to Asia, and concludes that regional decision-making 
centers are indeed important for many MNEs, a design choice largely neglected in the 
mainstream international business literature. The bounded rationality economizing issue 
clearly appears, when the author observes, for example, that the regional center will be 
more important, if the firm has a presence in a larger number of distinct economies in the 
region. Here, more opportunities exist for achieving regional scope economies, and  
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simultaneously, the complexity of managing foreign operations for senior, corporate 
management, also increases. The author’s primarily descriptive papers set the stage for 
rich, future work that can explain the choice of particular intra-firm regional governance 
mechanisms to economize on bounded rationality and bounded reliability. 
 
Yin and Choi (2004) study globalization versus regionalization, taking China as 
an example. One useful observation is that investment from proximate locations in Asia 
clearly experiences less difficulty in achieving proper linkages between FSAs and 
location advantages in China, than investment that has a more distant origin. Another 
interesting observation from their work is that many MNEs now face difficulties 
establishing proper linkages between their FSAs and China’s alleged location advantages, 
because of the limited supply of these location advantages, such as cheap, skilled labor. 
Here, the main barrier to globalization is not the absence of appropriate MNE FSAs but 
the unavailability of particular location advantages to these companies. Finally, China’s 
entry into the WTO will act as shift parameter, for both foreign MNEs in China and 
Chinese MNEs abroad, because it reduces transaction costs for both sets of economic 
actors.  
 
Millar, Choi, and Chen (2004) demonstrate that globalization may be easier to 
achieve in creative industries than in more conventional sectors. The main reason for this 
is again transaction cost related: high up-front costs in idiosyncratic branding and 
advertising/promotion function as linking or matching investments between the firm’s 
products and customers spread around the globe, thereby creating global demand and 
consumption.  
 
Grosse (2004) in his study of the largest financial institutions in the world 
observes that a broader geographic scope implies the selection of unique market 
segments. Indeed, bounded rationality problems and the danger of sub-goal pursuit, 
impose a trade-off between coordinating and controlling efficiently a geographically 
dispersed network of operations, but for a distinct market segment only, versus providing 
a broader scope of services, but within much more restricted geographic boundaries.  
 
Kolk (2004) describes the differential environmental reporting practices of large 
MNEs in Europe, North-America, and Asia. Environmental reporting can be given, at 
least partly, a TCE interpretation, since it creates a reputation of good corporate 
citizenship, and thus has transaction cost reducing properties in terms of facilitating 
“contracting” with a wide variety of stakeholders, including customers and suppliers. The 
author observes substantial divergence of environmental reporting practices across the 
triad, which means that local institutions matter, even for the largest MNEs, and that 
additional linking investments need to be performed in this area, if a firm wishes to 
benefit from the same TCE reducing effects in the host regions, as compared to those 
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